by voluntary diagnostic testing on an 'opting-out' basis, supported by adequate briefing. I Jane, aged forty and recently divorced, was talking to Anne, her friend from schooldays, now the mother of four sons. She was telling her about Dr Smith, the gynaecologist who had reassured her that the symptoms she had been worrying about were all attributable to the stress she had been going through. Dr Smith, Jane explained, had done all sorts of tests before giving his verdict; and although she had hated having to wait for the results, it had been worth it: she had begun to feel better almost immediately after he told her, and now she felt as fit as a fiddle. Dr Smith had not explained to her what all the tests were for, Jane added, but she suspected that one of them had been for AIDS. The doctor knew, after all, that her exhusband often worked abroad, and -well, all the reasons for the divorce.
'You didn't ask the doctor if he actually did that test then?' Anne enquired. Jane replied that she had been perfectly content to trust Dr Smith, who knew what he was doing. Anne, doubted if she would have been so happy about being tested for HIV antibody without first being asked. She was not even too sure that she liked the idea of the leaflet she had glanced at while waiting in her own doctor's surgery the other day. It had said that some people's blood samples might be tested anonymously for HIV. Fortunately, Anne had not needed to have a blood test on that occasion. But testing pregnant women One factor contributing to this is that HIV infection has the potential for becoming pandemic. The last great pandemic was in 1918, when influenza killed twenty million people. Since that time, while accepting that some diseases remain incurable, Western society has come to expect generally better health and effective health care. The prospect of a pandemic, clearly, is frightening, and as in all the great plagues of the past, it has given rise to social prejudice and misunderstanding. These problems may be reduced or aggravated by the extensive scope which the media offer today for both popular education and public misinformation.
The advent of AIDS and HIV infection thus presents an urgent challenge. The need to resolve issues affecting the social and professional response to AIDS creates an opportunity to re-examine ethical questions with significant implications for many other areas. The urgency of the issues is underlined by the fact that several important choices, about screening, testing, health education and everyday clinical management, already have been forced on policymakers and practitioners by the progress of the epidemic. Without a clearer understanding of the ethical principles involved, and of their application, individuals may be harmed, the good practice ofhealth care prejudiced, and the fabric of society damaged.
IMSE Working Party
Guidance on some of these issues already has been produced by professional and public bodies, as well as by organisations representing patients' interests, and some philosophers and others have begun to examine related ethical questions. Recognising this, it seemed to the Institute of Medical Ethics that there would be an advantage in bringing representatives of these different perspectives together in a working party, to try to clarify, consider and report on the principal ethical questions relating to AIDS and HIV infection. This is the first ofa series ofdiscussion papers prepared by the working party on the basis of its discussions. It is intended for both a professional and a wider readership, and it discusses two issues which raise both topical and basic ethical questions: (a) the ethics of anonymised testing; and (b) the ethics of diagnostic testing of pregnant women for HIV infection. lIII Blood tests, ethics and HIV 'Blood tests' are amongst the most familiar diagnostic procedures in modern medicine. To draw blood however, is an invasive act. Ethically, it can be justified only because there is no less drastic way ofaverting the threat, to a patient's life or health, posed by whatever the blood test is designed to investigate. Legally, the patient's consent is required before the clinician draws blood, and this is also a matter of simple courtesy. To return to the example of Jane and Dr Smith, it is inconceivable that the doctor would not seek the patient's permission in some way before inserting a needle into her vein. It is highly unlikely, moreover, that he would not explain, in however general terms, that his purpose was diagnostic.
But it is also highly unlikely that any clinician would explain to a patient the exact number and nature of all the diagnostic tests which could be done. At present, around five hundred diagnostic blood tests, of varying degrees ofcomplexity, could be undertaken; and while the clinician may request specific tests, the pathologist in the laboratory may augment these, or substitute others, for the proper investigation of the constellation of symptoms indicated. In the case of a relatively simple and familiar test, the clinician has no difficulty in explaining to a diabetic patient, for example, that another blood sugar test is proposed. But it is a different matter when samples are being taken for multiple investigations.
The complexity of modern diagnostic testing makes it unreasonable to expect the clinician to seek specific permission for each individual test. On the other hand, for the patient's consent to be reasonably informed, he or she needs to know something about the general role of the tests in the clinician's diagnostic thinking. A familiar moral difficulty arises here when the clinician suspects, but is not certain about, and hopes to exclude, a diagnosis with grave implications for the patient. Is the clinician morally required to tell the patient what he suspects, out of respect for the patient's autonomy? Or should he refrain from infficting what may turn out to be an unneccessary burden of anxiety on the patient? The nearest we can come to a general, morally satisfactory, response to this question, is by weighing probabilities: the reasons for telling the patient become more weighty in proportion to the strength and seriousness of the clinician's suspicions, and to the patient's indications of wishing to know. To detect the latter, however, the clinician must first provide adequate opportunity for, and comprehensible answers to, any questions which the patient may wish to ask; and for the patient to know what to ask, the clinician has to give some indication of the general options he is considering, using his discretion in proportion to the strength and seriousness of his suspicions.
In The moral aim of such testing -the public good and the health of individuals -is of great importance. It is so important indeed that some would argue not just for a policy of anonymised, but for secret anonymised testing. This would be justified by the argument that, for testing to be of the fullest value epidemiologically, there should be no possibility of those most at risk avoiding it. Despite the guarantee of anonymity, public knowledge that tests were taking place might discourage them from giving blood for other diagnostic purposes. For this argument to be morally justified however, it would have to be shown that the value to be derived from secrecy outweighed the injustice of depriving the public of its liberty to challenge, understand and influence official policy. Since many of those at risk ofHIV infection may be unaware that they are at risk, or will eventually seek diagnostic testing, the need for secrecy seems insufficiently weighty. In purely practical terms, moreover, it is unlikely that secret testing could be kept secret.
But will anonymised testing be less epidemiologically useful, if it is publicly stated that people giving blood for diagnostic purposes may request that it should not subsequently be tested anonymously for epidemiological purposes, and that their wishes will be respected? Here again the fear is that those most at risk will refuse and so, by escaping the epidemiological net, invalidate the purposes of the study. This argument against the opportunity of refusal, however, has to be weighed against three others, which argue that anonymised testing itself is unethical.
The weakest of these three arguments is that randomised anonymised testing is unethical because the blood is the patient's property. With these considerations in mind, the IME working party concluded that not only were there no serious ethical objections to anonymised testing for HIV, but that its introduction should be welcomed, provided that the Government's announcement that it would 'let patients know what is happening' was adhered to. The practical implications of this were noted in a letter from the Chairman of the working party to The Times, published on December 4 1989. These were as follows.
1. Most people do not readily understand what anonymised testing means. It will be essential to explain clearly how a blood sample taken routinely from a patient is made anonymous. 2. Some patients will be seriously concerned about widespread HIV testing which may include their own blood. The leaflets and posters should also explain concisely the scope and purpose of the surveys. 3. Any patients who express objection to their blood sample being anonymised in a survey should be assured that their blood will not be used. 4. Parallel publicity should be given to the availability for individuals on request of HIV-testing and associated counselling. The Goverment is measuring the spread of HIV infection (the virus which causes AIDS). The information collected will help us to plan services for the future. We hope you will be willing to participate. If you are having blood taken, a small drop of leftover blood may be separately tested for HIV. This drop will not have your name on it. If your blood is tested for HIV it will be impossible to trace it back to you, and participation will not affect your care, treatment, job or insurance.
If you have any questions, or object to your leftover blood being used for this, the doctor, nurse or midwife will be happy to speak to you in confidence. Your wishes will be respected.
If you are worried about HIV and want to have a personal HIV test, ask your doctor, or go to the nearest sexually transmitted disease (STD) clinic.
V Testing pregnant women
Pregnant women attending antenatal clinics are among those whose blood may be tested anonymously for HIV, after being tested diagnostically, for example for rubella. When anonymised testing of pregnant women was proposed, it was argued that they would provide an infection: the ethics ofanonymised testing and of epidemiologically useful group: they had recently been sexually active, but were not necessarily at as high a risk of HIV infection as people attending sexually transmitted disease clinics, another major group identified as an epidemiological sample. At that early stage, it was objected that it was unjust to use pregnant women as a 'captive population'. But any substance there may have been to this objection now has less force, since anonymised testing has been introduced as a public policy.
Diagnostic HIV testing ofpregnant women can raise more difficult ethical problems, however. As the case of Caroline and her baby, mentioned at the beginning, makes clear, the possibility of a positive result has serious implications for more than one individual. The risk of an HIV-positive mother transmitting the infection to her baby is currently estimated at between 10 and 50 per cent. Even ifan infected baby does not go on to develop AIDS, he or she may well be orphaned at an early age, or taken into care even earlier by a social work department which registers any child of an HIVpositive mother as 'at risk'.
These possible consequences for her baby, it can be argued, make knowledge of her HIV status more urgent for a pregnant woman than for other people. One obvious reason for this is that, in the light of this knowledge, she may decide to terminate her pregnancy; and even if she decides to continue with it, the information is material to making informed choices about her own and the baby's future.
A further argument, about the importance of a pregnant woman knowing her HIV status for the sake of her own health, may be less persuasive. Pregnancy and childbirth, it has been suggested, may precipitate AIDS in an HIV-positive woman who, were her pregnancy terminated, might remain healthy for much longer. This suggestion would provide a counterargument, in the case of pregnant women, to the argument that knowledge of one's HIV status confers no medical benefit in the absence of a cure. But the scientific basis for this suggestion is still controversial.
It remains true, however, that pregnant women may still have a greater and more immediate need than other people for knowledge of their HIV status. Because of this, when diagnostic HIV tests first became available, it was argued that it might be advisable to test all pregnant women for HIV, as a matter of antenatal routine, and without seeking explicit permission in advance. A precedent for this was available in the routine testing of pregnant women for syphilis, usually without clinicians telling them what the test was for. If asked, many clinicians would have justified this by saying that syphilis was sufficiently serious a possibility (for infants as well as mothers) to investigate, but also sufficiently rare not to merit burdening the woman with considering it as a possibility.
To follow the precedent of syphilis testing clearly goes against what we argued above -that it is ethically preferable to seek explicit permission for diagnostic HIV testing. The reasons for this, we argued, included the relative strength and seriousness of the clinician's suspicions before asking for such a test. In the case of most pregnant women, there may be no stronger reasons for suspecting HIV infection than for suspecting syphilis. But there is a great difference in relation to seriousness: if syphilis is diagnosed nowadays, normally it can be cured, unlike HIV infection and AIDS. Not seeking explicit permission for syphilis testing, even assuming that this is ethically defensible, therefore is not a morally appropriate precedent for HIV testing.
Pregnant women may have a greater and more immediate need than others for knowledge of their HIV status. But this is not a sufficient moral argument for testing them without first asking their permission. Nor, in the view ofone clinical member of the working party, does it justify routinely performing antenatal HIV antibody testing unless the woman declines. The view of this member is that the test should be offered to aJl women attending, on the basis that, following appropriate briefing and counselling, they may choose to have it. In some circumstances, the briefing and counselling may cause either clinician or patient to recognise the possibility of increased risk of HIV infection: this would add weight in favour of testing in that individual case. This approach, which could be described as an opting-in procedure, leaves the individual decision as an explicitly autonomous choice.
The majority of the working party, however, believe that the particular needs of pregnant women provide a sufficient argument for adopting a different approach in their case. Thus they favour a policy of routine, but voluntary, diagnostic HIV testing, on an opting-out rather than an opting-in basis. 'Opting-out', here, means that this is offered as one ofthe normal antenatal tests, and that it is not left to the woman to make a positive request for it. In practice, the woman is told that an HIV test is among those normally offered as part of antenatal care and, after briefing (the nature of which will be discussed below), she is asked if she does not want to have this test.
An opting-out procedure, it could be argued, may make it more difficult for a woman to say that she is not willing to have the test. In the majority view of the working party however, this risk is less than the risk that an opting-in policy may make it more difficult for the woman to request the test. Some members of the working party argued, for example, that an opting-in policy might discriminate against those who were less articulate, or lacked background knowledge of HIV infection and its associated risks. An opting-out approach, it was agreed, might mean that a woman who declined to have the test was treated, for infectioncontrol purposes, as if she were HIV-positive. But the measures involved are those which normally should be employed whenever body fluids are present. Thus, the combination of an opting-out approach with good clinical practice should be sufficient to rebut any suggestion that women who decline to have the test are being discriminated against. An opting-out approach to diagnostic testing, it must be emphasised, loses its moral force if it is implemented in the context of standards lower than those of good clinical practice, or for any reasons other than those of the interests of the pregnant women themselves.
The working party has heard evidence from pilot schemes adopting an opting-out policy of testing pregnant women for HIV antibody. This suggests that in practice as well as on balance of ethical principle, opting-out should be recommended at the present time.
VI Pre-test briefing
But there remains an important aspect to this which needs to be considered. It is generally agreed that some pre-test counselling is normally essential in the case of HIV testing; and it may be argued that to provide this for all pregnant women would be prohibitively expensive. This argument would have considerable force if the pre-test counselling required was of the kind required for patients whose clinicians have strong reason to suspect the risk of a positive result. And if, in the course of her antenatal care, what a pregnant woman's clinicians learn from her provide such strong reasons, a considerable amount of counselling will be required before the woman's consent is requested. But at present this is not the case for the majority of pregnant women.
Where diagnostic HIV testing is offered on a routine, opting-out, basis to pregnant women, therefore full pre-counselling is not required. What is required rather, are two things: first, that against the background of the general education and publicity about HIV infection available to the public at large, at the opting-out stage all women being offered the test should be given sufficient briefing or information for them to understand the nature of the HIV test; and second, that intensive counselling should be available when a pregnant woman, in whom there was no good reason to suspect it, is found to be antibody positive.
The 
